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theory of empirical cognition 
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I. Introduction 
Kant’s doctrine of things in themselves has puzzled his students and 
readers from the very time of its formulation, because it introduced, as some 
would claim, inconsistence into Critical philosophy. Specifically, it rendered the 
transcendental-idealist account of objectivity quite problematic. Using contem-
porary terms, one might say Kant offered both an internalist and an externalist 
explanation of the relation between minds and the world. 
Kant’s first critics, such as F.H. Jacobi, G.E. Schulze, K.L. Reinhold or S. 
Maimon, focused their criticisms on the so-called “problem of affection”, issuing 
from Kant’s attempt at explaining the fact that mind possesses representations of 
objects, an attempt which cost as much as reference to transcendental objectivity 
(i.e. absolutely external, mind-independent reality) and its alleged power of 
causation. In particular, the account of causality seemed implausible, since the 
concept of cause received both an empirical and an extra-empirical scope of 
application, while it should have been restricted to the former. How should 
causation be construed on this second, apparently illicit, mode of the application 
of the concept of cause? Can we talk about a causal relation linking two different 
kinds of entities with one another if we, by definition, do not know one of the 
members of the link; and if we can say nothing more about the causal relation in 
question than that it occurs?1 By definition – which means that no matter how 
advanced scientific investigations should be pursued, we will never get to know 
                                                 
1 What kind of conditions ought to be fulfilled by some given objects, or events, if we are to be 
eligible to establish a causal connection between them? Kant pointed to temporal priority of cause 
over effect and to the necessity characterizing a causal link (manifest in the irreversibility of the 
order of events thus linked). The temporal priority of cause over effect obviously does not provide 
a sufficient condition for a causal link occurring, nor is it, on some accounts, required. 
Anna Tomaszewska     Transcendental object and the “problem of affection”... 
 62 
that mysterious member of the relation. It seems, therefore, that Kant violated the 
“principle of significance”2 in that he spoke, in a positive manner, of the unknown 
cause of our representations. 
This conclusion might be too hasty, though, and perhaps a consistent 
“internalist” reading of Kant is anyway possible, without violating any relevant 
principles, that of significance included. In what follows, I would like to outline 
the problem’s details, firstly giving it historical background, and then suggesting 
certain interpretations, some of which, again to use a contemporary phrase, seem 
to defend Kant’s internalist account of justifying our knowledge claims. On such 
interpretations, Kant does not infringe the bounds of sense and he does not invite 
any “bad metaphysics” into his system, although, indeed, he commits an 
equivocation when employing the concept of cause. The way Kant makes use of 
the term “transcendental object” does not have to entail as much as reference to 
mind-independent (transcendent) reality; rather, it points to some logical or 
conceptual necessities inherent in our thinking of and experiencing the world. 
Kant’s argumentation would lead to recognizing some of these necessities. 
However, one might as well literally read the statement about the empirical 
link between transcendental objectivity and our representations. We will touch 
upon the issue in the due course of the essay. Now it suffices to remark that, 
                                                 
2 Strawson’s term; see: Strawson [1966] p. 16: “This is the principle that there can be no legitimate, 
or even meaningful, employment of ideas or concepts which does not relate them to empirical or 
experiential conditions of their application. If we wish to use a concept in a certain way, but are 
unable to specify the kind of experience-situation to which the concept, used in that way, would 
apply, then we are not really envisaging any legitimate use of that concept at all. In so using it, we 
shall not merely be saying what we do not know; we shall not really know what we are saying. 
This principle, which I shall refer to as Kant’s principle of significance, is one with which empiricist 
philosophers have no difficulty in sympathizing. They sympathize just as readily with the 
consequence which Kant drew from it: viz. the complete repudiation of transcendent 
metaphysics.” Strawson suggests that Kant left undamaged only the so-called immanent 
metaphysics, i.e. metaphysics of experience. But he is rather wrong in putting so great an emphasis 
on Kant’s repudiation of transcendent metaphysics. As Kant explicitly writes in the Introductions to 
the Critique (cf. e.g. B XXX), he only wanted to prepare the ground for a new scientific metaphysics 
which would be free from the flaws of the “old” one (the “field of an endless battle” (B XV)). By 
scientific metaphysics Kant did not, however, understand something like a metaphysics of science 
but rather the “old” metaphysics restored to its dignity after purification from the age-old 
controversies. As clearly and openly as his claims are made, it remains somewhat of a puzzle why 
so many contemporary commentators of Kant simply overlook them, ending up in slightly 
misguided interpretations which aim at reconciliation of transcendental philosophy with, e.g., 
some reductionist theories of mind. 
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apparently, the question concerning the cause of representational content has not 
been definitively answered until now by psychologists. Materialism does not offer 
an entirely satisfactory solution to the problem concerning the relation between 
the physical and the mental, and the reduction of the latter to the former leaves 
some of the well-grounded “folk-psychological” intuitions unexplained. We do 
not have to accept Cartesian dualism just to appreciate the indispensability of the 
intensional language we use in order to communicate our personal-level 
representational states (beliefs, expectations, convictions etc.). On the other hand, 
rejecting materialism, dualism and other “positive” stances leaves us, perhaps, in a 
position of not being able to answer some questions of considerable importance 
for the philosophy of mind. 
II. The “problem of affection”: historical background 
§1. One of the first and most influential critical comments on Kant’s transcendental 
idealism, which deals with the inconsistence brought about by the doctrine of 
transcendental objectivity, was formulated by his student, Friedrich H. Jacobi: 
“I was held up not a little by this difficulty in my study of the Kantian 
philosophy”, Jacobi wrote in the appendix to his dialogues on Hume, “so much so 
that for several years running I had to start from the beginning over and over 
again with the Critique of Pure Reason because I was incessantly going astray on 
this point, viz. that without that presupposition [i.e. that things in themselves exist 
– A.T.] I could not enter into the system, but with it I could not stay within it.”3 
Jacobi’s challenge taken up by the Kantians of that period comes down to 
the following claims: 
(i) if Kant takes all objects to be mere appearances, subjective entities with no 
existence outside our representations, he cannot postulate that there should be 
mind-independent realities (objects) affecting the senses, realities whose 
appearances we get to know; 
                                                 
3 F.H. Jacobi, David Hume über den Glauben; oder Idealismus und Realismus: Ein Gespräch, Loewe, 
Breslau 1787. The English translation of the fragment in Wayne [forthcoming]. 
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(ii) even if Kant grants the existence of such extra-experiential realities, he 
cannot legitimately apply categories to them (in this case the category of cause), 
which he nevertheless does, violating thereby what we have called the principle of 
significance; 
(iii) if Kant does apply the category of cause to the unknown ground(s) of 
our representations, he contradicts his earlier claim that things in themselves are 
unknowable. If things in themselves are referred to by means of objectively valid 
statements (judgments), i.e. statements employing the pure conceptions of the 
understanding, this means that they are not (utterly) unknown, and thus (to an 
extent) on a par with appearances. Therefore, the transcendental distinction, i.e. 
the distinction between appearances and things in themselves, loses its validity. 
Transcendental idealism proves self-invalidating. 
The problem, historically speaking, was solved by denying meaningfulness 
to the “noumenal discourse”, or, more properly, by rejecting the transcendental 
distinction. Interestingly, Kant’s followers pondered over yet another dilemma, 
namely that of the ground (first principle, foundation) of the systematic project of 
transcendental idealism, which they found missing. Both the first Kantians, as well 
as the great 19th-century idealists aimed at somehow improving Kant’s Critical 
project.4 Reinhold, for instance, suggested representation as the most fundamental 
element and starting point for his system. Fichte’s “starting point” was transcen-
dental subjectivity constituting (setzend) its opposite: the realm of objects, and 
constituting itself as constrained by its opposite. Unlike Reinhold, Fichte claimed 
to not have fallen into dogmatism:5 the subject-object intentional relation was 
deduced from the first principle by way of a kind of reductive (transcendental) 
argument. Hegel denied the unknowability of things in themselves, retaining the 
                                                 
4 Cf. Siemek [1977]. 
5 Dogmatism means, for Kant, the opposite of criticism. A critical philosopher does not accept any 
claim without first investigating its grounds. The critique of cognition, for instance, requires 
separating cognitive capacities from one another, attributing a due kind of content to them, and 
determining the source of that content, be it empirical or extra-empirical. If the content is extra-
empirical, a deduction demonstrating its indispensable contribution to cognition is necessary. 
Thus, if Reinhold takes the concept of representation as the cornerstone of his system, he proceeds 
dogmatically in that he neither refers this concept to experience, nor deduces it from other concepts 
or shows its place in the whole “conceptual scheme”. 
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subject, or mind (der Geist), as active “constitutor” of the world. Consequently, he 
arrived at the claim to absolute knowledge correlative to the absolute subject. 
On the transcendental-idealist account, the idea of objectivity absolutely 
external to the subject (mind) makes no sense at all; both subject and object are 
necessarily correlated. It is impossible meaningfully to think of an object outside 
this necessary correlation. Such a thought would be empty, i.e. without any 
cognitive content. Irrespective now of what the other idealists claimed, we should 
note that Kant understood cognitive content as experiential content, i.e. as the 
result of “cooperation” between both intuitional and conceptual constituents of 
experience.6 ”Intuitions and concepts”, Kant wrote in the A 50/B 74 paragraph of 
the Critique, “constitute the elements of all our cognition, so that neither concepts 
without intuition corresponding to them in some way, nor intuition without 
concepts can yield a cognition.” Thus, an empty thought would be one without 
intuitional content corresponding to the object of thought. Could we regard it as a 
thought in that case? Kant seems to give an affirmative reply. But such a 
contention implies either that thought can have other than intentional (subject-
object) structure,7 or that even if it retains that structure, it has to be granted some 
access to objects unlike the objects given in experience. However, thought deprived 
of its relational (intentional) character is no longer a thought, but mere sensing 
(perhaps with its quasi-objects like sensations); it lacks, therefore, representational 
content. Furthermore, the very concept of object as Kant construes it does not 
allow of the application of this concept “outside” the boundaries of experience: for 
Kant, the objective (i.e. the empirically real) equates with what can be given in 
experience.8 Apparently, Jacobi’s criticism levelled at the doctrine of things in 
                                                 
6 One might suggest here a conceptualist reading of Kant’s theory of experience, in line with the 
one advocated by McDowell [1994]. Some authors defend Kant’s nonconceptualism, though. See 
Hanna [2005]. Hanna indicates both conceptualist and nonconceptualist strands present in Kant’s 
dualist account of concepts and intuitions, and inspiring for representatives of both opposite 
camps. 
7 For that requires (possible) intuition in which the object is (can be) given. 
8 Of course, the meaning of the concept of object might be broadened, so as to include the “objects 
of reason”. Indeed, Kant distinguished between the objects of reason and real objects. But it seems 
that the proper meaning of objectivity he associated with the latter. See: Kant [2003]. Ontology, 
Kant writes (ibidem, p. 36), does not treat of objects, rather of concepts, laws and principles of pure 
thought. 
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themselves proves quite plausible so far. We do not understand what it means to 
think of something which eludes any meaningful thought, as the non-empirical 
(transcendental) “object” seems to. 
§2. Kant is sometimes charged with making an equivocation when using “cause” 
with reference to both appearances and the transcendental object. The following 
would be the easiest way out of the problem: by disambiguating an expression 
one might quickly get to the right – consistent – picture. Such a move might 
perhaps fall short of an oversimplification, though. As suggested earlier, we 
should consider the possibility of Kant postulating both a logical, or a conceptual, 
tie, on the one hand, and the causal one, on the other, between representational 
content and its ground. This could take us to interesting results: if the link is only 
logical, then this points to a fact about the way we think, about the distinctive 
marks of our rationality. Becoming aware of the fact at issue can have an impact 
on the evaluation of philosophical theories, granting precedence to some over the 
other on the basis of their conforming or not to the standards of rationality. But if 
the link is causal, meaning empirical, then it might be instructive to investigate the 
sources of the impediments occurring on the way to determining one of its 
members. Quite simply, the question is why we cannot have a good theory 
explaining mental phenomena in relation to their non-mental ground. 
Kant introduces the idea of noumenal causation in the following passage 
from the chapter on phenomena and noumena in the First Critique: 
The faculty of sensible intuition is strictly only a receptivity, a capacity of being 
affected in a certain manner with representations, the relation of which to one 
another is a pure intuition of space and of time (mere forms of our sensibility), and 
which, in so far as they are connected in this manner in space and time, and are 
determinable according to laws of the unity of experience, are entitled objects. The 
non-sensible cause (Ursache) of these representations is completely unknown to us, 
and cannot therefore be intuited by us as object. For such an object would have to 
be represented as neither in space nor in time (these being merely conditions of 
sensible representation), and apart from such conditions we cannot think any 
intuition. We may, however, entitle the purely intelligible cause (Ursache) of 
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appearances in general the transcendental object, but merely in order to have 
something corresponding to sensibility viewed as a receptivity. To this 
transcendental object we can ascribe the whole extent and connection of our 
possible perceptions, and can say that it is given in itself prior to all experience (A 
493-4). 
The fragment is quite compact; in it, Kant formulates several definitions, 
which it might prove worthwhile briefly to discuss: 
(1) The faculty of sensible intuition is equivalent to receptivity. 
(2) Receptivity is the capacity of being affected (in a certain manner) by 
representations. 
(3) Pure intuition of space and time provides the rules governing the 
relations of representations to one another. 
(4) Space and time are forms exclusively of our sensibility. 
(5) Objects are representations connected in space and time, determinable 
according to the laws of the unity of experience. 
This is the positive part of the fragment in question, which seems to give 
way, afterwards, to the characteristic of what apparently evades any 
characterizations. Now the idea might be that characterization of the latter makes 
sense but with that of the former one in the background; to put it otherwise, there 
should be a logical (conceptual) connection between Kant’s characteristic of the 
realm of experience and his introduction of the “transcendental reality”. The 
logical relation between the realm of experience and the non-experienceable 
would consist in the fact that the concept of the first should somehow bring to the 
fore the concept of the second: our acquiring or possessing experiential 
knowledge, when reflected upon, should result in our formulating a conclusion 
regarding some realm beyond the constraints of experience.9 Our fragmentary 
knowledge of reality has no value if not backed by a postulate making it somehow 
                                                 
9 One can see it as quite obvious what “non-experienceable realm” Kant must have had in mind, 
judging at least by his remarks and notes preparatory to the First Critique. (See e.g. the Philosophical 
Encyclopaedia, where he writes that all natural events have their natural causes, and the chain of 
causes goes on till it ends in God. I am referring here to the Polish translation of Kant’s book: Kant 
[2003] p. 42.) 
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grounded, the postulate our knowledge logically (or conceptually) implies.10 
Mind-independent reality, thus, cannot be that easily dismissed, on pain of 
reason’s losing its own authority. By introducing the conception of transcendental 
objectivity Kant makes empirical knowledge doubly-grounded, or alternatively he 
provides for two strategies of justification. The question is obviously whether they 
can coexist with one another.11 
Let us shortly comment on the above points. (1) restates the distinction 
between the two mutually irreducible sources of cognition, which Kant made at 
the beginning of the Transcendental Logic,12 sensible intuition being receptive, and 
understanding – spontaneous. Both receptivity and spontaneity cannot be 
exchanged: one cannot think by means of sensibility and intuit by means of the 
understanding. This seemingly obvious slogan expresses Kant’s disagreement 
with the empiricist (Lockean) account of concept-formation, on the one hand, and 
the rationalist (Leibnizian) theory of intellectual intuition, on the other. Would 
Kant concede that perception is concept-independent? 
Many contemporary theorists incline to not draw a clear-cut division 
between the sensible (perceptual) and the conceptual features of representations. 
Mental content, they argue, is never purely conceptual, or purely perceptual but a 
combination of both, and objects cannot be represented save through the concepts 
we use. For instance, E. Rosch uses the concept of “fundamental level”, which 
refers to the most basic level of the categorial organization of experience at which 
concepts somehow “come most closely” to the way things are; e.g., similarity is 
both a concept used in comparing two numerically distinct objects, and a feeling or 
an intuition of these objects having something in common. P. Gärdenfors’ theory of 
mental spaces aims at a unitary spatial interpretation of properties and concepts: 
both are “interpreted” as areas within multidimensional spaces which can be 
measured in terms of physical magnitudes corresponding to perception. In this 
                                                 
10 Surely, this is a metaphysical claim, and as much a strong one as was Aristotle’s inference to the 
First Mover as the initial link in the causal chain which had its beginning in nature. 
11 The strategy at issue might be called an epistemic and an extra-epistemic strategy of justification. 
12 See: A 51-2/B 75-6. 
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way, e.g. colour concepts receive a spatial – intuitional – representation.13 On many 
cognitive-psychological accounts, though, mental representations constitute two 
separate classes: one of concepts and the other one of percepts, both producing 
experiential output in the process of synthesis.14 What has to be explained in this 
case is how it is possible for percepts to combine with, or provide a sort of a basis 
for concepts, the thing Kant himself took interest in, attempting at some 
explanations e.g. in the doctrine of schematism and syntheses. 
The Kantian distinction might be regarded, however, as of merely 
methodological significance. Thus, it is not the case that concepts and intuitions 
remain mutually independent in our experiences, and consequently that 
experience involves nonconceptual representational content, rendering perception 
concept-independent; rather in the critical analysis we have first to regard the two 
classes of representations separately, to see the contribution of each of them to 
experience, and to find out what epistemic conditions they presuppose.15 
The concept of receptivity recalled by (2) emerges as parallel to the concept 
of spontaneity, the former pointing to the capacity of receiving, the latter – to the 
capacity of producing representations. The concept of representation makes in fact 
a bit of a problem: one ought to beware of exchanging the Kantian meaning of the 
term for that used by philosophers today.16 Kant divided representations 
(Vorstellungen) into intuitional, i.e. particular, and conceptual, i.e. general. 
Particularity involves reference to one object, whereas generality – reference to a 
plurality of objects. Contemporary authors are not unanimous about what 
conceptual resp. nonconceptual representations are. One of the most common 
characteristics of conceptual content links the concept of content with the Fregean 
concept of sense,17 and thereby with the concept of proposition. It is not perhaps 
                                                 
13 For a detailed discussion of the two theories mentioned, as well as other stances in cognitivist 
phenomenology of perception, see: Piłat [2006] Ch. 1. 
14 For a cognitivist interpretation of transcendental idealism see: Brook [1994]. 
15 Cf. Allison [1982/2004]. 
16 For a more thorough exposition of the issue see A. Banaszkiewicz’s introduction to the Polish 
translation of Kant’s Philosophical Encyclopaedia (Kant [2003]). 
17 Cf. Byrne [2004]. 
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entirely clear what kind of “entities” Kant meant when talking about 
representations: propositional or mental content, and though it seems more 
plausible to opt for the latter, still it is far from clear how this kind of content 
should be understood: if it were understood as content figuring in individual 
mental states, this would entail disavowal of the transcendental-empirical 
distinction with regard to subjectivity (or at least the distinction would be 
blurred). 
The problem of nonconceptual content can be expressed by the question 
whether there exist representations which, though not conceptual, represent 
certain features of the environment. Such representations, being intentional, 
would have their correctness criteria and they would convey information which 
would further on be productive of knowledge. This “production of knowledge” 
on the basis of nonconceptual informational content is something which 
contemporary theories cannot, according to the conceptualists, deliver an entirely 
satisfactory account of; strictly speaking, they do not explain how nonconceptual 
information can provide a sort of justification for a subject’s belief based upon that 
information. 
John McDowell,18 the key defender of conceptualism, claims nonconceptual 
representational content epistemologically irrelevant: only conceptual 
informational states provide the required kind of foundation and justification for 
experience-based beliefs. McDowell refers to Kant’s theory of experience 
elaborating the consequences of one of the most fundamental claims of 
transcendental philosophy, namely that all (human) consciousness involves self-
consciousness.19 If consciousness presupposes self-consciousness, and the latter 
hinges on the minimal conceptual capacity of self-identification and self-reference, 
then object-directedness (intentionality) implied by consciousness also 
presupposes conceptual capacities being in play. Since perception involves object-
directedness, it thereby has to involve conceptual capacities too. 
                                                 
18 Cf. McDowell [1994]. 
19 Cf. CPuR B 132. 
Anna Tomaszewska     Transcendental object and the “problem of affection”... 
 71 
According to (3), time and space (forms of intuition and pure intuitions 
themselves) constitute relations between representations. This means that they 
organize mental content, a contention leading to a question about the status of 
physical objects, also describable in spatiotemporal terms. If time and space 
organize phenomena, i.e. the objects of experience, as much as our representations 
thereof, how can phenomena differ from merely intentional objects? From the 
transcendental viewpoint, phenomena are intentional objects, i.e. objects of 
consciousness, but on the empirical level they fully retain their (existential) 
autonomy. Transcendental consideration of an object does not deprive it of any 
characteristics it possesses as an object of experience: mere reflection does not 
modify the content of experience, and so identifying objects with representations, 
as in (5), is not quite correct. 
As (4) says, on the Kantian assumptions, were there possible any other than 
merely temporal and spatial modes of intuition, they would not concern our 
(human) mode of knowledge acquisition. Kant does not exclude such alternative 
forms of intuition but he cannot make any positive use of this claim, since the 
alternative mode cannot be representable for us. Its idea, i.e. the idea of intellectual 
intuition, plays a negative role in Kant’s description of human cognitive capacities, 
delimiting their intrinsic constraints. Cognition from God’s perspective, for Kant, 
provides an ideal rather than gives shape to our epistemic practices. But “God’s 
perspective” is just a metaphor for the point of view from which things can be 
known as they are and with certainty; in other words – by reason. As those two 
provide for the crucial components of Kant’s idea of science, it must seem quite 
strange that he denies human cognition the possibility of getting through to things 
as they are in their essences, no matter how they appear in space and time, the 
more that he takes the possibility of science for granted. 
Finally, in the cited fragment, one comes across a statement that 
representations must have their cause, itself outside the scope of possible 
experience, and hence non-representable. Consequently, it cannot have the status 
of an object. Neither can it have the status of a subject viewed as a structure 
constituted by specific experience-conditioning functions. Numerous versions of 
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the speculation on what the transcendental object might be range from an 
interpretation ascribing the role of the cause of representations to God,20 to the 
cognitivist reading of the transcendental reality as a so far unknown structure by 
which cognitive functions of the mind are realized. On the latter reading, Kant 
establishes a causal (hence natural) rather than a logical (conceptual) relation 
between representations and their ground. If so, there is a chance that this link 
might one day be discovered by empirical sciences. So far, however, psychologists 
are rather skeptical about postulating anything more than a correlation between 
the mental and the physical, but postulating a correlation does by no means 
amount to establishing a cause-effect relation, neither does it prove that the two 
members of the relation share the same nature (i.e. the same essential features). 
§3. Let us now return to Jacobi’s dilemma. From the two candidates for affecting 
object(s) (the candidates for the “causes” of our representations of objects), i.e. the 
transcendental object (equated by Jacobi with the thing in itself) and appearances, 
neither can be considered adequate: the first because of its unknowability and the 
second – for their already being mere representations in us. Jacobi’s argument 
fails, however, on the invalid assumption that appearances are equivalent to 
subjective representations (what Kant calls modifications of inner sense), whereas 
they, more properly, mean for Kant objects of experience, the objects in space 
included. Admittedly, Kant is to blame for terminological confusion resulting 
from his not explicitly distinguishing different senses of “representation” and 
“appearance”. Sometimes he speaks of appearances as if he identified them with 
empirical, spatio-temporally locatable objects, but he also associates them with 
subjective representations, thus moving from the transcendental onto the 
empirical level of considerations. 
Hans Vaihinger,21 one of the earlier readers, editors and commentators on 
Kant’s philosophy, formulated the problem of affection as a trilemma. He would 
                                                 
20 The “God of philosophers”, obviously: a “Self-thinking Thought”. Such an interpretation would 
fit the characteristic of the transcendental object as “something corresponding to sensibility viewed 
as a receptivity”, i.e. as a pure, spontaneous – atemporal, and so non-human – understanding. 
21 For a detailed discussion of the problem, as well as its interpretations and solutions by various 
authors, see: Allison [1982/2004]. 
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name three candidates for affecting object(s), again all of them apparently bad, 
though he stayed by the third suggestion. These included: things in themselves, 
objects in space (with which he rightly associated the Kantian appearances), and 
both of them. The doctrine of double affection is not the best way out of the 
problem, however, because it leads to the identification of things in themselves 
with empirical objects on the same phenomenal level (it implies that we can have 
knowledge of the in-itself reality in the same sense in which we have knowledge of 
the empirical one), and thus to forgetting about the transcendental distinction. 
According to some contemporary authors,22 the problem of affection has 
been misconstrued as it derives from a false assumption that the appearances-
things in themselves distinction is one between two kinds of entities, rather than 
between two perspectives – the empirical and the transcendental – of considering 
an object. From the empirical perspective, it becomes considered as 
spatiotemporally conditioned, and from the transcendental perspective – in 
abstraction from the conditions of space and/or time. The point is not that objects 
(in general) can exist outside the spatiotemporal framework but rather that they 
can be thought of regardless of their spatio-temporality, merely under conceptual 
conditions of acquiring knowledge of them.23 
Allison intends to show that the whole talk about the transcendental object 
deals with Kant’s distinguishing a set of conditions – both perceptual and 
conceptual – under which objects can be cognized. It is not only the set of 
conditions provided by the forms of intuition (spatiotemporal relatedness) that 
                                                 
22 Allison [1982/2004]. Allison inherits the two-perspectives interpretation from Prauss [1974], pp. 
30-45, who talks about three possible ways of reading the appearances-things in themselves 
distinction: the empirical, the transcendent-metaphysical and the transcendental-philosophical – 
the only correct one, according to the author. In the last sense, “thing in itself” (Ding an sich) 
provides an abbreviation for “thing as considered in itself” (Ding an sich selbst betrachtet). 
23 The following passage from Kant’s Opus postumum proves that the two-perspectives account is 
present in Kant’s considerations: “Sinnenobjekte, deren Mannigfaltiges in der Anschauung nur 
durch das Verhältnis desselben im Raum und der Zeit bestimmbar ist, stehen a priori unter 
Prinzipien der Vorstellung ihrer Objekte als Erscheinungen, denen noch eine andere Vorstellungsart 
notwendig in der Idee korrespondiert, sie als Dinge an sich zu betrachten, wo doch das Ding an sich = x 
nicht einen [besonderen] anderen Gegenstand, sondern nur einen anderen, nämlich den negativen 
Standpunkt bedeutet, aus welchem eben derselbe Gegenstand betrachtet wird.” (In Adickes [1978], pp. 696-
7 (C 563f.) (my italics – A.T.).) Fragments confirming the two-perspectives interpretation can also 
be found in the CPuR (see, in particular, B XXI). 
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suffices for cognition of an object, since that has to be both perceptually and 
conceptually mediated. Considering the transcendental object is tantamount to 
considering the object in general in its relation only to thought and its conceptual 
conditions, and it leads to recognizing intentionality (subject-object relatedness) as 
a necessary feature of thought. The doctrine of affection serves Kant merely to 
emphasize that in any account of empirical cognition reference to the concept of 
object must be present. Allison’s account does not enable an explanation why we 
have any representations of objects, or what their cause is, only on what 
conditions we can have them. To explain under what conditions mind can 
represent the objects does not amount to explaining what causes these 
representations. The latter deals with “grounding” our knowledge, and thereby 
with the purpose of our epistemic practices. As such, it implies a metaphysical 
question which the theoretical part of the Critical philosophy has difficulties to 
cope with.24 Kant cannot remain consistent while granting, like Descartes, that it is 
God who guarantees objective reference to our cognitions, neither can he posit any 
kind of correspondence between cognition and its object unless the object becomes 
from the outset identified with an appearance. But then the role of the cause of 
representations would have to be ascribed to mind itself, which it is anyhow 
difficult to understand. For Kant has at least two theories of mind and two modes 
of consideration of the latter: the empirical and the transcendental, and the 
relation between them is far from unambiguous. 
Furthermore, are we really justified in understanding the question as 
metaphysical? Kant introduces causation, and thus an empirical relation, where 
there should obtain a rational relation of grounding. Thus, two – mutually 
exclusive – options emerge: (1) a metaphysical and (2) a naturalistic account of the 
non-representable cause of our representations. In the following section, I intend 
to look at these options more closely. Interestingly, both seem equally plausible, so 
the choice between the options might depend on rather extra-theoretical reasons.25 
                                                 
24 This is clearly because it has embarked on a criticism of metaphysics, having obliged itself to 
suspend all metaphysical claims until they have been made subject to the critique. 
25 This ambiguity (as well as many other intrinsic to Kant’s work) perhaps explains the 
development of the idea of transcendental idealism in contradictory directions. Kant’s reception on 
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III. Two attempts at a solution 
§1. The interpretation of the problem of affection to be considered first was 
suggested by Nicholas Rescher in his essays on Kant.26 He recognizes in the 
doctrine of transcendental objectivity a comeback of Leibnizian metaphysics, 
although in an epistemological rather than ontological guise. Rescher names two 
types of causal discourse to be found in the Critique: one in which Kant considers 
“authentic causality” obtaining within the experiential realm and ordering 
phenomena in accordance with the principle of causality, and one in which Kant 
refers to “a not properly causal generic grounding which is merely intelligible”.27 
Whereas the principle of causality helps establish a definite type of relations 
within the realm of experienced objects, it is, according to Rescher, the 
epistemologically reinterpreted principle of sufficient reason that establishes 
relations between experience and objectivity (construed as the unconditioned). 
According to Rescher, reason postulates the existence of mind-independent, in-
itself reality in order to endow cognitions with objective validity – a 
(quasi)property of judgments, making them proper candidates for truth-valuation 
– and in order to block the infinite regress in the series of conditions necessary for 
a natural event to occur. The idea of the unconditioned provides, too, for a 
necessary regulative condition of our epistemic practices: it (i.e. the cognition of 
the absolute reality as a whole) is something we strive for, though never attain, as 
much as truth in Ch. S. Peirce’s theory of inquiry. Rescher turns transcendental 
idealism into a kind of conceptual idealism, with the thing in itself as the pure 
object of thought (pure intelligibile). 
Does not this reading render reality Kant makes claim for an “als-ob”28 
reality? The idea of the extra-empirical becomes apparently turned into a fiction, 
                                                                                                                                                    
the Continent greatly diverges from that in the English-speaking world, where attempts have been 
made at naturalization of the transcendental project. One is for sure: the “Copernican revolution” 
or – much more properly – the anthropocentric turn (cf. Miles [2006]) had diverging consequences, 
all of which, however, undermined the classical view of the world. 
26 See: Rescher [1972] and Rescher [1981]. 
27 Rescher [1972] p. 463. 
28 H. Vaihinger seems to be the first to have used this term. 
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which it is useful to believe in, in order to maintain the meaningfulness of the 
practices (be they epistemic, communicational, moral or whatever) one gets 
involved into. From another point of view, though, the fictitiousness of the idea 
does not make much of a problem: for we are not interested in whether the idea is 
true (scil. whether it has a referent), but more in its role as one of the conditions 
constitutive of our rationality, as one of the minimal requirements making our 
intelligent rapport with the world and with other rational creatures possible. In 
other words, we are interested in our conceptual scheme and the fundamental 
ideas, or minimal beliefs constitutive of it, one of them being that our statements 
do refer to reality external to our mental representations. 
§2. Another interpretation, a naturalized version of the problem of transcendental 
affection, might be suggested on the basis of some mind-theoretical readings of 
Kant, like that by Andrew Brook,29 who argues that Kant’s overall position is at 
least compatible with materialism, pointing to brain, or central nervous system, as 
the non-representable cause of mental representations. He writes: “The only 
account Kant can allow us to give of things, including representations, as they are, is 
whatever turns out to give the best account of things, including representations, as 
they appear. Thus, if materialism turns out to give us the best account of 
representations as they appear to us, which is how things seem to be turning out, 
Kant would have to accept it.”30 The idea is that materialism can, apparently, best 
explain the fact that mind possesses representational content. However, assuming 
that brain stands for the cause of our representations, do we not violate the 
previous qualification concerning nonrepresentability of the “transcendental 
cause”? After all, theoretically, there can be no difficulties in representing, and in 
making observations of brains, provided we dispose of necessary technical 
equipment. This is true but the objection fails as soon as we make out that Kant 
had an inferential theory of perception. That implies that the only immediate objects of 
                                                 
29 See: Brook [1994]. The importance of this interpretation consists in the fact that it highlights some 
major points of Kant’s theory from the standpoint of cognitive science. Brook reads functionalist 
ideas into Kant’s theory of the mind, emphasizing the dualism of concepts and intuitions and the 
role of syntheses in the theory. 
30 Brook [1994] p. 17. 
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awareness one can think of are representations, and not the objects represented 
themselves. Since mind, thus seen, has unmediated access only to its 
representational content, knowledge of the properties of objects must be 
inferential. Thus, we will never have knowledge of anything as it is in itself and 
we may as well dispense with this kind of knowledge claims. Materialism turns 
out, again, a hypothesis, with no ontological commitments implied. But then why 
should one posit a correlation between mind (let us call it a global representation) 
and brain? After all, should the link occur possible, both members of the relation 
should have something in common, if not a common nature. If the relation in 
question is causal, both of its constitutive elements must be physical in nature. It 
would be rather awkward to say, however, that representations possess physical 
properties. At most they can possess the function of pointing at physical properties 
of objects. Does this understanding of the concept of representation properly 
match Kant’s intentions? If the idea of naturalizing transcendental philosophy is to 
prove successful, it must also make sense to explicate the Kantian concept of 
representation in terms of an information-carrying unit.31 But, naturally, a 
question arises as to what this information should be about. Obviously, about 
certain properties of the environment, but if we stick to the Kantian distinctions, 
all representations might be divided into pure and empirical, the former relating 
specifically to the characteristics of the subject or mind which they characterize. 
Since Kant shows that all experience and its epistemic value turns on its a priori 
constitutive structure, all empirical information (information about the object of 
experience) must at the same time contain the information about the subject of the 
very experience. Thus, in the Kantian sense, not only do representations have the 
function of pointing at certain properties of the environment, but they are also 
self-referential, in the sense that they too convey the information on how they 
perform their function of informing about the environment. This could all be 
expressed in naturalistic terms but for the Kantian “transcendental story” about 
the unknown object affecting cognitive faculties: how can we know that mental 
representations are about any features of the environment if there is some 
                                                 
31 Much as it is done in Dretske [1995]. 
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unknown interfering factor modifying the kind of content these representations 
have? Thus, any supporter of the naturalistic interpretation of Kant’s theory of the 
mind must reject the doctrine of transcendental idealism, and consequently the 
transcendental distinction (one into appearances and things in themselves). What 
remains could be called an empirical-level theory of mind, something which it 
seems rather doubtful Kant would recognize as the whole story he had to tell 
about human cognition. 
§3. Can we draw a comparison between the above suggested interpretations? If 
they share any common points, this is the fact that they both remain in line with 
the Critical philosophy, eschewing dogmatically metaphysical commitments, or 
promoting neutrality on ontological issues. Neither of them says, for sure, what 
the transcendental ground of our representations is, the first only suggesting we 
approximate it in our cognitive practices, the second naming no more than a 
candidate for it. But both readings differ with respect to their intentions. Rescher 
wants to show how come our knowledge can and should be grounded, and thus 
why it can be knowledge at all, with its particular claim to certainty. Brook, for his 
part, inclines to establish a functionalist reading of Kant being compatible with 
materialism in philosophical psychology, nowadays a commonly acknowledged 
position in the English-speaking philosophy of mind. Materialist accounts of the 
mental, if cogent, are preferable for several reasons: they resolve (or dissolve) the 
notorious problem of the relation between the mental and the physical; they 
provide for a unitary explanation of mental phenomena; they have more 
explanatory power than other (e.g. idealist or dualist) accounts, as they make 
explicit references to and find confirmation in scientific experiments and 
observations. 
But which of the suggested interpretations suits Kant’s interest best? For 
sure, Kant was rather hostile to materialism mostly by virtue of its consequences 
for practical philosophy; he definitely wanted to make room for metaphysics.32 As 
much as physical or mathematical knowledge, metaphysics should contain 
                                                 
32  Cf. the Introductions to the CPuR. 
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synthetic a priori judgments: apodictically certain – i.e. certain without recourse to 
experience, like the axioms of mathematics – and expanding our knowledge. This 
could be attained by metaphysics developing an intrinsic relation to our practices. 
Knowledge is but one example of the practices human beings get involved into. 
Hence, as much as other practices, cognition too needs a regulative idea: the 
search for truth would not make much sense if we did not implicitly presuppose 
that our cognitive practices do (sometimes) result in the cognition of truth, i.e. the 
way things are irrespective of what we think or know of them. 
§4. Section II §2 of this essay was dedicated to an analysis of some of the aspects of 
the Kantian dualism of concepts and intuitions. Now it is time to relate those 
considerations to the two interpretations of the transcendental affection problem 
presented in Section III. That there is a connection between these two issues might 
be shown at least by remembering a historical fact that Kant’s introducing the 
transcendental distinction resulted from his earlier investigations of the two 
sources of cognition (sensibility and understanding) and the respective differences 
between the kind of cognition they deliver. His 1770 Inaugural Dissertation, 
entitled De Mundi Sensibilis atque Intelligibilis Forma et Principiis, gave rise to a 
series of arguments for separating the phenomenal world of experience from the 
(hypothetical) realm of metaphysical “entities”, later to receive the name of 
noumena. 
On the reading suggested by Rescher, reason necessarily postulates a 
comprehensive system of knowledge, a system comprising the whole reality, and 
so something like the Hegelian absolute, as a regulative idea governing our 
experience-constrained epistemic strivings. Indeed, as Kant says, “all human 
knowledge begins with intuitions, proceeds from thence to concepts and ends 
with ideas” (A 702/ B 730). All modes of cognition are interrelated and 
interdependent: knowledge begins with subjective sense data, proceeds to 
intersubjectively communicable judgments about intersubjectively accessible 
objects, to culminate in the idea of a system of knowledge valid for all subjects. 
Although Rescher does not explicitly state it, the reading he proposes places Kant 
in the close proximity of Hegel. 
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Now what could be the connection between the conceptual-idealist reading 
of Kant’s doctrine of transcendental affection (noumenal grounding) and certain 
interpretations of the intuition-concept dualism? As regards the latter sort of 
interpretations, two kinds of reading can be distinguished: the conceptualist and 
the nonconceptualist. To restate the query: does the postulate of the objectivity (or 
what is now more commonly called intersubjective communicability) of 
knowledge imply any theoretical decisions as to the nature of experiential content? 
Generally speaking, I think not, but does the general answer apply to Kant as 
well? I would venture to claim it does not.33 The reason consists in Kant’s 
subjectivist – or internalist – point of departure on which it is impossible to 
formulate a set of correctness criteria for nonconceptual representations of objects. 
One cannot say on what conditions one could correctly nonconceptually represent 
the objects of experience since one does not dispose of any positive determination 
of the environment, or external reality, as it would be when logically cut off from 
the subject of experience. Such a positive determination already makes the object 
of experience concept-dependent: for Kant – to repeat a commonplace – the objects 
of experience are “constituted” by both the intuitional and the conceptual a priori 
factors. 
The idea of objectivity being merely regulative only requires that the subject 
believed his representations do convey information about the extra-mental reality. 
As the idea of nonconceptual experiential content refers to non-human or pre-
linguistic modes of perception, we arrive at a conclusion that only rational human 
creatures, equipped with conceptual capacities, may play the role of the subjects of 
knowledge. Intentionality – or object-directedness – pertains only to concept-
employing creatures,34 this being one of the ineluctable consequences of Kant’s 
anthropocentric turn. 
                                                 
33 And so McDowell’s Hegelian interpretation of Kant’s theory of experience he furthers in Mind 
and World would contain more than a grain of truth. 
34 The above stated does not by any means entail that rational creatures cannot entertain non-
intentional experiences, only that such experiences do not have cognitive value. 
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IV. Conclusions 
Jacobi, who formulated the problem of transcendental affection, found out 
that the transcendental distinction leads to a paradox: as he expressed it, without 
the transcendental object one cannot enter the Kantian system, but with the 
transcendental object – one cannot stay within it. The difficulty can be rephrased 
in terms of the above suggested interpretations: the metaphysical and the 
naturalistic one. Jacobi’s problem, recapitulated in terms of the former, could be 
stated thus: Kant’s theory of knowledge requires thought of the objective, mind-
independent reality as a necessary component of the Kantian account of 
rationality. Only with the underlying idea of objective reference of judgments, as 
candidates for truth-valuation, can our knowledge-claims be satisfied without our 
falling prey to skepticism. But as mind-independent reality becomes merely 
posited, it thereby loses its independence from the mind, regardless of its being 
posited as objective. There is, all in all, no way out of this trap of the 
transcendental subjectivism. 
Naturalizing the transcendental theory of knowledge leads to no better 
results: by reading the causal relation between the transcendental and the 
empirical reality as a natural relation linking physical entities, one automatically 
shall reign from the transcendental distinction, and the very theory of 
transcendental affection shall not play its explanatory role any longer. Either way, 
revision of Kant’s epistemology becomes mandatory. Indeed, looking at the 
development of Kant’s thought one can easily notice that the revision did take 
place, and that in the opposite directions.35 
                                                 
35 I would like to thank the anonymous referee for comments on the initial version of this paper. 
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